TABLEThe voting cycle in EU language choices (1995-2004)
| Delegations | UK |
UK & F |
UK & F & G |
UK & F & G & I |
UK & F & G & I S |
UK & F & G & I & S &
N |
UK & F & G & I & S &
N & O |
| UK | 1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
| F | 7 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
| G | 6 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
| I | 5 |
6 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
| S | 4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
| N | 3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
| O | 2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
1 |
| B | 7 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
| L | 7 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
The languages are added to the repertoire from left to right in order of decreasing ‘Q-value’ (cf De Swaan, 1993). The higher the entry, the lower the preference. It is assumed (1) that member states prefer a language repertoire that includes their language above one that does not; and next, (2) that among these options they prefer a repertoire with fewer languages above one with more languages.
UK refers to United Kingdom and English,
F refers to France and French,
G refers to Germany and German,
I refers to Italy and Italian,
S refers to Spain and Spanish,
N refers to the Netherlands and Dutch.
O refers to all other member states of the European Union, and their respective languages: Portugal, Greece, Denmark, Sweden and Finland.
Austria is assumed to vote like Germany, Ireland like the U.K.;
Belgium (B) supposedly prefers all combinations with F over those without it and all combinations with F & N over those with F only (combinations with N and without F are not put to the vote).
Similarly, Luxembourg (L) prefers combinations with F & G over combinations with F only, and combinations with F over combinations without it.
In this constellation the addition of any one language is opposed by all member states, except the one whose language is to be added. Conversely, the proposal to exclude a language receives the support of all member states except of the one that stands to lose its language privileges. Thus, any series of votes on the language repertoires mentioned in the Table will at some point produce ‘English only.’ which will then be defeated by the proposal ‘all languages’ and at that point another cycle of eliminatory votes may start. Remarkably, if the single member states are allowed a veto (as they are on important issues in the Council of Ministers), none of the above proposals can defeat any other and the status quo will always prevail. This is probably a realistic rendering of the ‘official’ and ‘public’ language policy: complete paralysis in favor of the original policy of ‘all official languages in public’. But otherwise, each single elimination proposal is accepted against the opposition of one or two votes only, except one: eliminate the ‘other languages’ from ‘all languages’, which is opposed by all the member states with ‘other’ languages. This coalition could be split up if there was consensus on voting for the elimination of these ‘other’ languages one at a time, against solitary opposition from the one country affected in each vote.
Under these conditions, the status quo is especially hard to change by any kind of majority vote or when vetoes are allowed.
See also Abram De Swaan: Words of The World, Polity Press 2001, pp. 169-171
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